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This contribution provides an interdisciplinary analysis of expressions of austerity 
policies. It is argued that expressions of austerity policies are meaningful if and 
only if the intended addressees’ psychological states are adequately attuned and 
the conceptual preconditions for implementation met. Furthermore, it is argued 
that if the addressees are suitably psychologically attuned and these preconditions 
met, utility will, by definition, be maximised and successful economical recovery 
enjoyed in equal measure among austerity implementors. The paper is divided 
into five sections. In the first section, the political scene is set in which austerity 
policies are expressed and the terminology is introduced. In the second section, 
expressions of austerity policies are dissected and an analysis of the reference 
conditions of such expressions provided. The third section reviews a conceptual 
analysis of intending and acting together and relates it to jointly implementing 
austerity policies. In the fourth section, the economic rationale behind expressions 
of austerity policies is evaluated with reference to what in economic theory is 
called team-reasoning theory. It is concluded, in section five, that given suitably 
psychologically attuned implementors of austerity policies, expressions of austerity 
policies are economically rational. But we should be sceptical about their economic 
motivation: if the people referred to, to implement austerity, are different from those 
calling for austerity policies, then it might appear, in the long run, that the former 
bear a burden for the good of the latter.
1 This research was funded by the European Science Foundation’s EUROCORES programme 
EuroUnderstanding and carried out as part of the NormCon group. I am grateful to two anonymous 
referees for important comments, and to the editors and the European Science Foundation for the 




The day after the topic of this volume was announced, the 10th of February 2012, a 
fifth austerity policy was passed in Greece, including a 22% reduction of minimum 
wage, the facilitation of lay-offs, cuts in welfare systems, and a 300 million euro cut 
from pensions for 2012 only (Süddeutsche 13th February 2012). As of July 2013, 
approaching publication of this paper, new austerities have been passed including 
layoff of 25 000 public employees to secure further rescue loans (The New York 
Times 18th July 2013).    
Austerity measures are motivated by need to stop the decline in the European 
economy, and are preceded by peculiar political statements. For instance, 
Sweden’s Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, suggested that we will have to work 
longer to maintain the welfare state (Swedish Radio, News, 7th February 2012) and 
Sweden’s Minister of Enterprise, Annie Lööf, suggested that the young would have 
to accept lower wages and less employment security, otherwise employers would 
not be able to afford them (Swedish Television, Agenda, 9th October 2011). Pedro 
Passos Coelho, Prime Minister of Portugal, when announcing austerity measures, 
said “People of Portugal, I know you are asking whether all the sacrifices will be 
worthwhile. I can assure you, they are” (AP News 3rd May 2013).
Closely examined, these statements include three components. First there is 
the subject-term ‘we’, the referent of which is not explicit; secondly, there is an 
intention on which the ‘we’ is supposed to act; and, thirdly, there is a goal that the 
‘we’, if acting appropriately, is expected to realise. 
The present contribution analyses austerity-measure statements and assesses 
the economic rationale behind them. The hypothesis is that the reference of ‘we’ is 
ambiguous, owing both to the volatile psychological mechanisms fundamental to 
people’s self-representations under a ‘we’-label, and to the ontological stratification 
into physical, social, and institutional levels of reality at which ‘we’ can be taken to 
refer (section 2). I will also examine whether, given unambiguous ‘we’-referencing, 
the referred to group is capable of jointly realising the goal that austerity-measure 
statements express (section 3) and whether it is economically rational for its 
members to reason as a team rather than individualistically (section 4). These 
three steps, taken separately, represent the psychology of social identification, the 
philosophy of sociality, and the economics of team-reasoning. Jointly, they provide 
definitions and predictions about the success of austerity measures. 
Now before we begin, some clarification of terminology. I regard austerity-
measure statements as types, of which the examples above are tokens. I will 
use the term ‘s-sentence’ to speak of austerity-measure statements and the term 
‘a-content’ to speak of the action-intentions expressed, so as to avoid repetition of 
these tokens. Sometimes I will use ‘y’ as a dummy for specific actions expressed in 
s-sentences’ a-content. By the phrase ‘conditions of satisfaction’ of s-sentences, I 
will mean the conditions that must be met in order for a ‘we’ to realise successfully 
the goal in the a-content – that is, the conditions under which s-sentences refer to 
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people acting together with economic success. We begin then with one assumption 
(1.1) and one definition (1.2):
1.1. Austerity measure-statements (s-sentences) have three parts: (i) referential 
(‘we’), (ii) action-intentional (a-content), and (iii) utility-prospects.
1.2. S-sentences are satisfied if and only if,
 (i) they refer,
 (ii) the referent acts according to the a-content, and
 (ii) the intended utility is realised. 
II. The reference of ‘we’
Someone will have to bear the burden of austerity measures. The first step in 
our investigation is to arrive at an interpretation of who that is – who the ‘we’ in 
s-sentences are. This step involves determining what it means to identify with a ‘we’ 
and how ‘we’-identification differs from ‘I’-identification (2.1), providing reference 
conditions for s-sentences (2.2), and determining the ontological status of the 
proposed referent. Without an understanding of these matters, an understanding 
of when, to whom, and how s-sentences refer is out of reach. I turn to social 
psychologists and philosophers of the social sciences to pin down each component 
of this first step. It should be kept in mind that the conceptual tools to be used are 
selected for purposes of disambiguating expressions of austerity policies. It is not 
argued that these are the, or the only, conceptual tools best suited for this purpose, 
but they do help us make sense of to whom such expressions refer and whether 
the referent can act as a ‘we’.  
 
2.1. The Psychology of social referencing and self-representation
Marilyn Brewer once said “Groups that become overly inclusive or ill-defined lose 
the loyalty of their membership or break up into factions” (1991, 478), echoing 
Simmel’s proposition that the imposition of large-scale organizational frames 
upon social elements which themselves tend toward differentiation contain the 
instrument of their own destruction (1908/1971, 275). What Simmel and Brewer 
accentuate is the tension in conative forces underlying individual- contra collective-
directed prioritization. I will use the term ‘psychological connectedness’ to denote 
the strength of the relationships between individuals and the groups to which they 
belong. It is the strength of such relationships that Simmel and Brewer investigate. 
Their research is of interest for understanding how and if there is a cohesive ‘we’ 
to which s-sentences refer.
According to Simmel and Brewer, levels of self-representation can be pictured 
diagrammatically as ever-larger concentric circles where the central point 
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represents the individual. From the individual outward each expanse represents a 
social subgroup – families, neighbourhoods, communities, etc. (Brewer 1991, 476). 
The probability of the prioritization of self-representation from the self to significant 
others and then to larger groups is a function of the width of the largest circle and 
the quantity and distances between smaller circles down to the individual point 
(Ibid., 478). If a more collective self-representation is distant, merely symbolic, or 
abstract – for instance, if the only connection to other members is ‘having red hair’ 
– and the number of possible close knit collective self-representations is low, then, 
as Brewer and Kramer (1986, 548–649; See Kramer and Brewer 1984) showed, 
individuals tend to downgrade collective self-representation. 
Thus, the strength of psychological connectedness is a function of (i) group-
size and (ii) membership-criteria (Simmel 1908/1971, 252, 257, 262; Brewer 1991; 
Brewer and Caporeal 1995; Brewer and Gardner 1996; Brewer and Chen 2007).
Furthermore, among social groups we can distinguish at least two kinds. First 
we have membership social groups. Membership social groups are such that, 
for any individual picked out by the group-label it is not necessarily true that that 
individual has a self-concept corresponding to the label. If the individual has such a 
self-concept it is not necessarily true that that individual entertains, at any particular 
time, a self-representation corresponding to the self-concept (See Brewer 1991, 
477). Belonging to membership social groups is, hence, not necessarily freely 
chosen. In contrast to membership social groups, social identity social groups are 
such that, for any individual member it is necessarily true that that individual has 
chosen to identify with the group, hence the individual has at least a rudimentary 
self-concept corresponding to the group-label. It is not necessary, however, that 
if the individual identifies with the group in this voluntary sense that she always 
entertains a self-representation corresponding to the self-concept (See Ibid; Devos 
and Banaji 2003; Dasgupta et al. 2000; Greenwald et al. 1998). Importantly, when 
speaking about social categories, identification with and membership in categories 
can be either exogenously or endogenously given, as a result of external imposition 
or internal disposition, respectively. 
In this connection, I want to pay homage to the late Nobel Laureate in economics, 
Elinor Ostrom. Ostrom (2000) report that individuals’ willingness to cooperate and to 
contribute to common goods within locally designed resource regimes outperforms 
cooperativeness in externally enforced regimes. Ostrom’s explanation is that, 
although externally enforced cooperative behaviour prevents non-cooperation, it 
also prevents the development of social norms of cooperation (See Crawford and 
Ostrom 1995). The prediction is that, as soon as there is a chance of anonymity 
or escaping from detection, individuals in externally imposed resource regimes 
will defect from cooperation (See Bicchieri 1990, 2006). Ostrom’s reasoning might 
explain the findings of Brewer and Kramer (1986) that, in large groups allowing 




Thus the strength of psychological connectedness, apart from (i) and (ii) above, 
is also a function of (iii) membership-autonomy.
Now, predictions about individualistic–collectivistic prioritization in self-
representation should include considerations of dimensions (i)–(iii). Lets call the 
three dimensions: group-size, the concreteness of group membership-criteria, 
and membership-autonomy. The first dimension pertains to the observed fact that 
collectivistic prioritization is primed by groups that are not too large or too small – 
what has been called ‘optimal distinctiveness theory’ (Brewer 1991, 478; See 1993 
2003; Leondarelli et al. 2010). The second dimension pertains to the observed fact 
that, for collectivistic prioritization to be primed, membership criteria should not 
abstract away too many significant individual traits. The third dimension pertains 
to the observed fact that externally imposed membership jeopardizes loyalty and 
collectivistic prioritization.
To end this subsection, I propose that we have arrived at the following proposition 
about the psychology of self-representation: 
2.1.  The probability of prioritizing collectivistic over individualistic self-representation 
is a function of (i) the distinctiveness of individuals within the group and the 
distinctiveness of the group with regard to other groups, (ii) the concreteness 
of membership-criteria, and (iii) membership-autonomy. 
Returning to the first part of my query, “What is the referent of s-sentences?” 
proposition 2.1 helps frame the answer. 
2.2. The referent of ‘we’
Dimensions of psychological connectedness serve to clarify s-sentences’ reference. 
The referent of the subject-term ‘we’ in s-sentences is not definite. That is, who 
the ‘we’ is, is unclear. Now for s-sentences to refer the subject-term ‘we’ must 
pick out, either, some pre-existing social group the psychological connectedness 
of which is sufficiently strong, or, it must create a group-frame that people come 
to use as reference in self-representation. Lets call these states of affairs the 
‘reference conditions’ of s-sentences. There are then two possibilities of reference 
for s-sentences. Either they do refer in one of the senses specified in the conditions 
of reference, or they do not refer. Lets specify these two possibilities further.
First, if neither of the reference conditions obtain, s-sentences lack a referent 
and are meaningless (in the sense of expressing an action-intention of no one). 
Second, if either of the reference conditions obtain, s-sentences refer to a social 
group, either because such a group already exists or because people start to use 
the ‘we’-frame as reference in self-representation. However we can derive from 
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proposition 2.1 that, if s-sentences refer, then it is nonetheless indeterminate to what 
degree members of the referent-group represent themselves as group-members. It 
follows from the psychology of self-representation that even if the reference of ‘we’ 
is unproblematic, the distinctiveness, abstractness, and membership-autonomy 
involved in belonging to the ‘we’ influence whether group-members identify with 
the ‘we’.
The conclusion to draw is that even if s-sentences refer, the referent is 
psychologically volatile. To answer the question to whom, and if, ‘we’ in s-sentences 
refer, then, we must (i) settle whether the reference conditions obtain. Then, if 
they do obtain, we must (ii) investigate the characteristics of the referent-group, 
along the dimensions expressed in proposition 2.1. From (i) and (ii) we arrive at a 
probability value of successful reference of any token s-sentence. Then justified 
predictions can be made. Thus, to end this subsection, on the reference of ‘we’ in 
s-sentences, the following proposition suggests itself:
2.2. The conditions of reference of s-sentences are states of the world where either 
(i) there exists some group the members of which represents themselves as a 
‘we’, or (ii) the utterance frames a ‘we’ which people use as reference in self-
representation – if neither (i) nor (ii), then s-sentences lack a referent. 
In the following subsection, I draw a distinction between three ways in which 
existential statements in general can refer. It is illuminating to point out, when 
speaking of social phenomena specifically, that, according to prevalent theories 
in the philosophy of sociality at least, there are three levels of reality at which 
statements about ‘what there is in the world’ can be interpreted. Failure to distinguish 
between these levels might lead to bafflement about what I have said here about 
reference of s-sentences. 
2.3. Three levels of reference
It might be asked, “Is it not obvious to what token s-sentences refer?” The reasoning 
might be that, apart from the fact that the subject-term ‘we’ is ambiguous in utterance 
– something any pragmatic listener with sufficient contextual information should 
easily apprehend anyway – it is nonetheless a fact that there are social groups. 
Certainly, it might be said, there are, for instance, pensioners, wage labourers, 
Spaniards, Europeans, and so on, and s-sentences refer precisely to such groups, 
independently of their members’ self-representations. This subsection answers 
such questions by showing that the reasoning behind them is fallacious. The fallacy 
stems from confusing the levels of reference. 
To illustrate the fallacy, I turn to a rapidly growing research area in philosophy: 
social ontology. Social ontological statements are statements about what there is, 
and the existence conditions for what there is, in ‘social reality’. Social reality has 
Lo Presti
187
some peculiar features not shared with physical reality. John Searle has elegantly 
drawn two distinctions relevant to distinguish social and physical reality. Admittedly, 
focusing on Searle’s theory is a restriction of the field and thus doing so leaves out 
alternative approaches to social ontology. However, his theory is the most discussed 
and is well known in economic theory and other disciplines outside philosophy. So, 
without arguing that Searle is right, I use his theory as a hermeneutic for present 
purposes. (For criticism, see Johansson 2003; Zaibert 2003; Meijers 2003). 
First we distinguish mind-independent from mind-dependent facts. Mind-
independent facts are those whose existence is not conditioned on attitudes, 
beliefs, representations, or any other mental states about them. Mind-dependent 
facts are those whose existence is conditioned on mental states about them. So, 
for instance, the fact that there are 60,8 million organisms with specific cellular 
composition within a certain geographical area is independent of what anyone 
thinks about the matter, whereas the fact that there are 60,8 million Italians is 
dependent on our representing them as ‘Italians’ (See Searle 1995, 7–9; 2010, 18). 
The first fact is ontologically mind-independent whereas the latter is ontologically 
mind-dependent. 
Secondly, we draw a distinction between two senses of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’. 
That something is objective or subjective can be understood in an ontological or 
an epistemic sense. In the ontological sense, objectivity and subjectivity pertains 
to modes of existence. Thus the mind-independent fact that there are 60,8 million 
organisms within a certain area is ontologically ‘objective’, because it does not 
depend on anyone’s perspective, whereas the mind-dependent fact that someone 
think of these organisms as ‘Italians’ is ontologically ‘subjective’, because it is a 
fact about someone’s thoughts. In the epistemic sense, ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
are predicates of judgments about ontologically objective or subjective facts. For 
instance, in our social world “there are Italians” is epistemically ‘objective’, because 
for there to be Italians it must be agreed by a sufficient amount of people that a 
group is to be represented as ‘Italians’, whereas “Italians are more handsome than 
Swedes” is epistemically ‘subjective’, because no one has to agree with the utterer 
for it to truly express her attitudes (1995, 8–12; 2006, 13–15).
Now social reality is delimitated by the class of mind-dependent, ontologically 
subjective but epistemically objective or subjective facts. Within this division, for 
something actually to be a social fact, Searle claims that the fact in question has to 
be collectively mind-dependent. In philosophers’ jargon, there has to be ‘collective 
intentionality’.
Intentionality is a property of aboutness of mind. When we ask, for instance, 
what someone believes, desires, prefers, fears, and so on, we are in effect asking 
what those mental states are about (1983, 17–18). So, the belief that there are 60,8 
million Italians can be divided into two parts: the belief-part, which determines 
the kind of mental state, and the content-part, which determines what the mental 
state is about. What the mental state is about is called its ‘intentional object’ (Ibid). 
Collective intentionality, then, is an aboutness-kind mental state of individuals, 
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expressible as, for example, “we believe __”, “we fear __”, where the underscore is 
a placeholder for intentional objects. 
This far we have distinguished mind-independent from mind-dependent, and 
ontologically subjective and objective from epistemically subjective and objective, 
levels of reality. Within this division social reality requires collective intentionality 
and is found at the mind-dependent ontologically objective side of the divide. Now, 
there is yet a higher level of reality, which has been called ‘institutional’.
Institutional reality is distinguished from social reality by the inclusion of ‘status 
functions’ (See Tuomela 2007). Status functions are functions of individuals 
according to which individuals are in position to act in ways specified in ‘status 
function declarations’. Status function declarations are declarative speech acts, that 
is, they declare that something is the case. For declarations to be successful, what 
they express as being the case must become the case as a result of the expression. 
For status function declarations to be successful, the status expressed as being 
assigned must apply as a result of the expression. Linguistically represented, status 
function declarations have the form, for example, “Herman Van Rompuy counts as 
the Prime Minister of the EU”. 
Obviously, for function assignments to be successful there has to be collective 
intentionality – else there could be no recognition (aboutness) of Van Rompuy 
(object) as Prime Minister (function). Now, once we have status functions, we also 
have institutional facts. It is an institutional fact that someone has a status that 
entails obligations, permissions, etc., to act in ways that constitute the status, within 
the context in which the status applies. That someone is Prime Minister is not a 
physical fact because it is mind-dependent, and it is not a social fact because it 
requires a special kind of collective intentionality (aboutness). The special kind of 
collective intentional states that distinguish institutional facts is acceptance (Searle 
1995, 117–18; 2010, 102–4). By ‘acceptance’ is meant any confirmative attitude 
toward a status function, not necessarily ‘approval’. 
Other philosophers emphasise collective acceptance as constitutive of 
institutional phenomena. Raimo Tuomela, for instance, says that it is a prerequisite 
of group-membership that the relevant individuals have collectively accepted an 
‘ethos’ – a set of goals, beliefs, and premises in decision making that defines 
them as a group (2007, 187; See 2005, 332; Tuomela and Tuomela 2005, 51). 
Collective acceptance, according to Tuomela, amounts to a joint intention to satisfy 
the group’s ethos (Tuomela 2007, 20), which means, in short, that each individual 
intends to perform actions that are required or permitted, or at least acceptable, for 
the furthering of the ethos, and that he or she does so in part because it promotes 
the ethos (Ibid, 30). The requirement of collective confirmative attitudes for the 
occurrence of institutional phenomena is common to many philosophers (See 
Gilbert 1989, 301–3; Pettit and Schweikard 2006, 33–4; Bratman 1992/1999, 100–
1). 
What we need to keep in mind is that when we speak of the existence of classes 
of entities in the world, we can do so, on the present account, on three levels 
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of reality: physical, social, and institutional. When we speak of social entities, we 
speak of entities dependent for their existence on collective mental states about 
physical facts, that is, on collective intentionality. When we speak about institutional 
entities, we speak of entities dependent for their existence on collective mental 
states of a confirmative attitude-kind about social facts.
Now then, reconsider the above objection to my formulation of the reference 
conditions of an s-sentence. Such sentences, it was objected, refers to whatever 
group of people, for example, pensioners, wage labourers, Spaniards, Europeans, 
which the utterer intends it to refer to, because, after all, there really are such 
groups. We can now discern the fallacy, the confusion of levels of reference, behind 
the objection. 
At the physical level there are people that have reached a certain age, or live 
within a common geographical area. Ontologically objectively there certainly 
is a physical referent, but this does not entail that there is any social referent. 
At the social level, reference depends on what people collectively think about 
people that have reached a certain age, or live within the common geographical 
area. Ontologically subjectively there really are social groups given peoples’ 
appropriate attitudes about the physical referent. At the institutional level, if indeed 
by ‘pensioner’, ‘wage labourer’, etc., we mean people with rights, duties, and so 
on, then whether s-sentences refer depends on peoples’ collective confirmative 
attitudes about such group-statuses. Given such collective confirmative attitudes, 
then, ontologically subjectively and epistemically objectively speaking, there really 
are pensioners, wage labourers, Spaniards, Europeans, and so on. Therefore it 
cannot be maintained that, for example, ‘Europeans’, with all the statuses that 
such people have, is independent of what the referent thinks about Europeans. 
Hence the objection is averted. That is to say, the fact that we can meaningfully 
address such a social group presupposes that its members represent themselves 
as members of that group. And here we can fruitfully reconnect to the above 
social psychological analysis of social identity: if it is a fact that people represent 
themselves as members of a group, for example, ‘Europeans’, this is a function of 
them having chosen to be identified as members of that group. This in turn depends 
on the size of the group, its remoteness in terms of psychological connectedness 
from closer groups, for example, the family or the region, and the membership 
criteria for being a group member. Just assuming that there is, in reality, such a 
group as ‘Europeans’, is therefore a rash leap over many intricate psychological 
and conceptual preconditions that must be met for the assumption to be true. 
Furthermore, if in fact there is a group to which austerity measures refer, this is still 
far from there being any fact of the matter about whether the group can act as a 
‘we’ on the basis of the austerity measures, as we will see in the next section.      
In conclusion, and in line with propositions 2.2 and 2.1, s-sentences’ reference 
is ambiguous, not only as a result of the volatility of psychological connectedness, 
but also as a result of the different ontological strata at which reference can be 
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interpreted. Lets end this subsection with a final proposition about the referent of 
‘we’ and a short discussion about s-sentences’ reference:
2.3. Reference of s-sentences is ambiguous because of the (i) physical, (ii) social, 
and (iii) institutional levels of reality at which s-sentences can be interpreted. 
Presumably, s-sentences should be interpreted as referring to the institutional 
level. The groups referred to by, for example, Pedro Passos Coelho when he 
suggested told the ‘People of Portugal’ that austerity will be worthwhile, and by 
Fredrik Reinfeldt when he suggested that ‘we’ will have to work longer to maintain 
the welfare state, would make no sense if taken to refer to certain multicellular 
organisms or to groups outside a network of obligations, duties, rights, etc. In a 
sense, then, proposition 2.3 is rhetorical. We already know at what level reference 
is intended. However, it follows from the analysis that generated proposition 2.3 
that the use of ‘we’ at the level at which it should be interpreted will lack connection 
to any fact at that level if there are no collective confirmative attitudes about there 
being, for example. ‘pensioner’ or ‘Portuguese’.
We are now in position to conclude section 2 on psychological togetherness 
and on reference of s-sentences with the following definition:
2. The ‘we’ in s-sentences refer to a social group if and only if, 
 (i) individuals identify the ‘we’ as a frame of reference in self-representation; 
because either 
 (ii) (a) there is a social group connoted by ‘we’ whose psychological 
connectedness is sufficiently strong, or
 (ii) (b) ‘we’ frames a social group which individuals come to use as a frame of 
reference in self-representation; and
 (iii) the ‘we’ corresponds to a fact on the institutional level of reality, that is, 
to a social identity represented and accepted as having right, duties, and 
obligations.
Definition 2 is to be thought of as a set of individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for s-sentence reference. The ‘because’ in condition (i) is not 
meant in the causal sense but in the sense that individuals have (ii) (a) or (b) as 
reasons for (i). 
In the final analysis, who is to bear the burden of economic decline in present 
day Europe is not easy to settle, because the semantics of ‘we’ is polysemous, 
the psychology of groups multidimensional, and the ontology of groups stratified. 
But to who will decide who will bear that burden, if anyone, will ultimately be all the 
people subject to the institution that we call ‘the EU’. How much the people are 
ready to accept, as a collective, if indeed they accept that they are a collective, will 
adjudicate who, if anyone, will bear the burden. 
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III. ‘We’ in intention and action
From now on, I will speak as if s-sentences actually refer. That is to say, I will 
grant that the use of ‘we’ satisfies the conditions in definition 2. My focus will be, 
given that the reference of ‘we’ is unproblematic, what does it take for the other part 
of s-sentences, that is, the a-content, to be satisfied? In other words, what does 
it mean to say that a group acts together, for example, and implements austerity 
policies, as a ‘we’? 
These have recently become philosophically explosive questions. To ascribe 
intentionality and agency to collectives is to mock deeply rooted assumptions that 
only individuals can have mental states and act. Conceptualisations of intending 
and acting jointly are multifaceted but can, with some care, avoid philosophical 
pitfalls. Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 explain joint intentionality and joint agency in the 
spirit of the philosopher Raimo Tuomela. 
3.1. Jointness in modes of intentionality
It is largely agreed in the philosophy of action that actions are individuated by 
intentional states that cause them. An intentional state can be expressed by “I 
want to ___” or “He intends to ___”. If the action represented by the underscore 
is performed on the basis of an intentional state, then it is adequate to say that the 
person was the agent of the action (See Searle 1983; Anscombe 1957). 
Donald Davidson famously said that for something to qualify as an action and 
not merely as a happening or an event without agency, it must be intentional under 
some description (1971/2001, 45–7). For instance, unless I intend to stumble on 
the threshold my stumbling is not an action of mine. If I intend to fetch a book from 
my office and my entering the room is necessary for me to succeed, then although 
stumbling over the threshold is indirectly caused by my intention to fetch the book, 
my intention does not include ‘stumbling over the threshold’, and thus the stumbling 
is not an action of mine (See Searle 1983, 98–102). 
Extending Davidson’s analysis of individual agency to an analysis of collective 
agency is problematic. To begin with, for it to be true that people acted ‘jointly’ it 
seems necessary that the action must be intentionally joint. If it is not intentionally 
joint under some description, then it is not an action of ours or of a we. But what 
then is a ‘joint intention’?
Basically, there are three alternatives. Either (i) joint intentions are defined in 
terms of the intentional subject, that is, to a group-subject where the members 
intend ‘as one body’ or as a ‘plural subject’, in Gilbert’s sense (1989, 199–202); or 
(ii) joint intentions are defined as intentions with the same content, that is, agents 
try to reach the same goal when acting; or (iii), joint intentions belong to a specific 
type of intentionality, not to ordinary ‘I’-intentionality but to ‘we’-intentionality, and 
are defined in terms of that distinct mental type (See Searle 1990). For each 
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alternative there arise philosophically intriguing questions. I cannot enter in-depth 
the extensive literature on these matters.2 Rather, I will focus on one philosopher 
whose theory of joint phenomena touches all three alternatives. I am thinking of 
Raimo Tuomela.
In Tuomela’s analysis of intentionality, we can distinguish three levels. First 
we have ordinary private ‘I-mode’ intentionality; secondly, there is private other-
regarding ‘pro-group I-mode’ intentionality; and thirdly there is pure other-regarding 
‘we-mode’ intentionality. ‘Private’- and ‘other’-regarding is here meant in the conative 
sense, that is, as a predicate for the motivations that generate the intention. Thus, if 
my private desires, preferences, etc., generate an intention to satisfy these private 
states, then I intend in the ‘I’-mode; if, on the other hand, my private states generate 
the intention to satisfy these states in part because it also furthers others’ goals, 
then I intend in the ‘pro-group I-mode’; lastly, if the states that generate the intention 
are shared with others as a result of collective acceptance, then I intend in the ‘we-
mode’ (Tuomela 1993, 87–9; 2000; 2007, 47, 53–6).
What distinguishes these modes of intentionality is the degree of sharing of 
intentional states. From the bottom up, in the ‘I-mode’ it is not necessary that an 
individual shares her intention, for example, to go to London, with anyone for her 
to I-intend; in the ‘pro-group I-mode’, it is necessary that she at least has a belief 
that her going to London is compatible with others’ goals; in the ‘we-mode’ it is 
necessary that it is mutually believed in her group that her going to London is 
the group’s goal (Tuomela 2007, chapters 2 and 3). ‘Mutual belief’ is philosophical 
parlance for beliefs about beliefs in higher-orders. For instance, for there to be a 
mutual belief that my going to London is in my group’s interest, each member of the 
group must believe that my going to London is in the group’s interest and believe 
that every other member believes that my going to London is in the group’s interest, 
and believe that every other member believes that every other member believes 
this, and so on theoretically ad infinitum (See Lewis 1969, 52–6; Tuomela and 
Miller 1988, 381). So when we define the different modes of intentionality, modes 
are distinguished from one another in terms of the degree to which individuals 
share a goal-state, that is, to what degree their intentions overlap. 
Another important dimension along which modes of intentionality differ is 
the dimension of commitment. According to Tuomela, in ‘I-mode’ intentionality 
individuals are only committed to themselves in actualising their intentions, while 
in the ‘pro-group I-mode’ individuals are socially committed to each other to act 
compatibly with each others’ goals through their self-interested actions. In the 
‘we-mode’ individuals are collectively committed to the group to further the goals 
collectively accepted as the group’s goals (2005, 332; 2007, 52–3).
Many philosophers understand commitments as integral to social phenomena, 
but they differ as to the normative status of commitments. For instance, Gilbert 
2  But see especially Bratman (1992; 1999; 2009), Gilbert (1989; 1990; 2009), Searle (1990), List 
and Pettit (2011), and Kutz (2000), for a variety of differing views. Throughout this section I will some 
times compare Tuomela’s analysis with these. 
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(1989; 2006, 5; 2009, 179) conceives of commitment as essential to the formation 
of joint intention and as entailing rights and obligations of involved individuals 
to the effect that others are in a position to sanction anyone who breaches the 
intention. According to Bratman (2009, 153–6), the normativity in joint intentionality 
is understood in terms of the normativity in individual intentionality. In individual 
intentionality it is a norm of rationality, rather than of morality, that one ought to do 
what furthers one’s goal; likewise, it is a norm of rationality in joint intentionality that 
one ought to do what one can to further one’s goal, which may include helping others 
to contribute. For Tuomela, collective commitment amounts to Gilbert’s normative 
notion, that is, rights and obligations (2000; 2007, 37–40), but also responsibility for 
maintaining group-cohesion (2007, 38).
We have, then, three modes of intentionality, ‘I-mode’, ‘pro-group I-mode’, and 
‘we-mode’, each characterised by different levels of jointness of interests, the 
sharing of intentions, and commitment. 
To satisfy Davidson’s dictum, that an action is an event that is intentional under 
some description, in cases of joint agency it seems the action must be intentionally 
joint under some description. We have now seen that for intentionality to be ‘joint’ 
is (at least (in the ‘pro-group I-mode’) for their intentions to be generated out of 
interest for compatibility with others’ goals, where there is belief about others’ 
goals, and where individuals are committed by private intentions to promote the 
success of others. In a stronger sense (the ‘we-mode’), intentions are joint under 
some description only if generated out of interest in a common goal, where there 
is mutual belief about the goal, and where individuals are normatively committed 
to each other as a group to promote the group’s goals and to maintain group-
cohesion.
Consider now the a-content of s-sentences; that is, what austerity measure 
policies tell a ‘we’ to do. Assuming these sentences refer, asking whether the 
a-content specifies joint intentionality is asking what mode of intentionality is 
involved. We have three alternatives. First, if it is the ‘I-mode’, then s-sentences can 
be read, “‘We’ must ‘ψ’ because of ‘private interest’”. But if that is the case, then, on 
conceptual grounds, it is not because ψ is our goal that we must ψ, but only insofar 
as it is anyone’s private goal, and thus ψ is not jointly intentional. Secondly, if the 
a-content of s-sentences is to be understood in the ‘pro-group I-mode’ sense, then 
s-sentences can be read, “‘We’ must ‘ψ’ because ‘ψ is compatible with our shared 
interests’”. On this reading, on conceptual grounds, individuals are interested in 
their goals being at least compatible with others’ goals, and this much is believed. 
But it is not the case that anyone’s intention is generated from a conception of 
the goal as the group’s goal, nor need there be mutual beliefs about each others’ 
goals, nor are individuals committed to any shared goal. If, lastly, the a-content 
of s-sentences is to be understood in the ‘we-mode’ then s-sentences can be 
read, ‘We’ must ‘ψ’ because ‘ψ is in our interest’”. On the ‘we-mode’ reading, then, 
on conceptual grounds, the a-content specifies joint intentionality because it is 
collectively accepted, and mutually believed, that ψ is our goal. Consequentially, 
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on the ‘we-mode’ reading of the a-content of s-sentences everyone is normatively 
committed to the ‘we’ (i.e., to the group), to ψ and to see to it that the ‘we’ is held 
together in the endeavour to ψ.
CWhat mode of intentionality are we to opt for in interpreting s-sentences’ 
a-content? Obviously, since the ‘I-mode’ does not amount to jointness, the a-content 
of s-sentences cannot be read in that mode, because it is contradictory to say that 
it is a private intention of an ‘I’ to act as a ‘we’. The ‘pro-group I-mode’ reading 
does preserve some degree of jointness of the a-content – at least in the sense of 
avoiding incompatible interests and obstructing of goals. However, in the ‘pro-group 
I-mode’ reading the ‘we’ in s-sentences does not quantify over the a-content, since 
in this mode intentions are private and the ‘we’ only enters individuals’ beliefs about 
other’s, not a we’s, goals. So, in this mode, austerity policies would not address a 
‘we’, but only address people’s beliefs about a ‘we’, and beliefs do not act. Thus to 
opt for a ‘pro-group I-mode’ reading of s-sentences’ a-content is to disregard that 
it is a ‘we’ that must act, and that austerity measures thus must address a group at 
an institutional level of reality, that is, to a group with collectively accepted goals. 
Therefore, the only reading of the a-content of s-sentences that makes any sense 
is the ‘we-mode’ reading, where ψ is in our interest because ‘we’ have agreed upon 
it and mutually believe this, and ‘we’ are collectively committed as group-members 
to actions specified in the a-content. 
Returning now to practical matters concerning the reference of expressions of 
austerity measures imposed in ‘Europe’ and on ‘Europeans’, these expressions 
can be made sense of only on the understanding that people are appropriately 
psychologically attuned to identify a ‘we’ and to represent themselves as ‘we 
Europeans’. From there, people must furthermore collectively accept what is 
constitutive for that membership, what its goals are, what its ethos is. If this is not the 
case, then, according to the above analysis, psychologically and conceptually, there 
is no real ‘we’ to actualise policies. Therefore, if there is no collective acceptance 
of and social self-identification with the ‘we’ to which austerity measures are 
supposedly addressed, that such measures can be carried out by whomever it is 
that politicians are referring to is either a political figment or a desperate call for a 
unity that people do not accept.   
From the analysis here presented, and fully in line with definition 2, we can 
conclude this subsection with the following definition:
3.1.  The a-content of s-sentences specifies joint intentionality if and only if, 
 (i)  it is generated from an interest to promote the group’s goals, which are 
 (ii)  collectively accepted by its members under conditions of mutual belief, and 
 (iii) the members are collectively committed on normative grounds to promote 
the satisfaction of the goals.
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It is instructive to bear in mind that clause (iii) can easily be changed in light 
of political changes. Suppose, for instance, that a law is passed enforcing the 
implementation of austerity measures. In that case a social group membership 
is forced into existence and action as a ‘we’ by its members for the purpose of 
actualising the policy is enforced. This would be to move from calling for acceptance 
of measures that presumably need to be carried out, and from a call for committed 
unity, to enforced unity and coercion. Whether this picture represents reality today 
I leave for the reader and future historical research to settle.
3.2. Possibility-conditions and success-conditions for joint action
Suppose a collection of individuals share a frame of reference in self-representation 
under which they identify themselves as a ‘we’. Thus, when someone correctly refers 
to this collective and urges it to act, there actually is such a ‘we’ (in accordance with 
definition 2). Suppose, furthermore, that this ‘we’ has goals, beliefs, and common 
traits constitutive of membership to which there is a collective commitment and 
about which there is a mutual belief. We then have a referent and joint intentionality, 
and thus satisfaction of both parts of s-sentences – reference and goals. 
But now, what does it mean to say “‘we’ ‘ψ’-ed together”? In other words, under 
what conditions were ‘we’ acting as a collective? According to the philosophers 
that I have referred to above, two kinds of conditions must be met. The first kind of 
conditions is possibility conditions for joint action (See Tuomela and Miller 1988, 
374). The second kind of conditions is success conditions for joint action (See 
Searle 1983, 97). Let’s begin by elaborating the possibility conditions.3
The first possibility condition is that the action is ‘we-mode’ action (definition 
3.1 must be satisfied). We do not act as a ‘we’ if we do not intend to act as a ‘we’. 
Secondly, the action to be performed must be of a joint action type, which means 
that the action is part-whole divisible: there is for each participant a ‘slot’ for her 
contributory part-action. It is not meaningful to say “we must ___” or “we did ___” 
if members of the ‘we’ cannot or could not participate. A third possibility condition 
of joint action is that each participant intends to perform her part as her part, which 
means that each participant intends her part to contribute to the whole action 
(Tuomela and Miller 1988, 376; Tuomela 1993, 90; 2000; 2005, 330). Fourth, each 
participant must believe that the possibilities for joint action obtain for a sufficient 
number of other participants. That is to say, one cannot, at least rationally, intend 
to do something that one does not believe is achievable, and one cannot rationally 
intend to do jointly what one believes not to be jointly achievable (Tuomela 2005, 
330; 2007, 93–4).
3  If the reader is unsatisfied with my choice of a theoretical foundation in this discussion and is 
interested in alternative approaches, I refer her to Gallagher (2004), Sebanz et al. (2006), Michael 
(2011), Butterfill (2012), and Lo Presti (2013a, 2013b). 
Dictatorship of Failure
196
We have, then, four possibility conditions for joint action, in the ‘we-mode’ sense 
that are relevant here: (i) agents jointly intend an action in the ‘we-mode’; (ii) the 
action is of the joint type, that is, part-whole divisible; (iii) agents intend to do their 
respective contributory parts; and (iv), it is mutually believed among them that (i)–
(iii) obtain, that is, each believes that (i)–(iii) obtain and believes that the others 
believes this, and that others believe that they believe this, and so on (2005, 340–1; 
but see Searle 1990, 1995). 
Now the success conditions for joint action is the non-accidental realisation of 
the jointly intended action, that is, to have jointly, intentionally performed a joint 
action type by means of contributory parts that actually contributed to the whole. 
The whole, remember, must have been a goal collectively accepted for the group 
under conditions of mutual belief. 
An interesting consequence of the possibility and success conditions for joint 
action is what Tuomela (2007, 48) calls the collectivity condition. If we pause and 
contemplate the logical structure of a ‘we-mode’ intentionally joint action it dawns 
that, necessarily, if the action is successful for one participant then it is successful 
for all. Simply put, it cannot be the case that a ‘we-mode’ intentionally joint action, 
that is, an action in which each participant shares the same collectively accepted 
goal and succeeds in performing contributory parts to that goal, satisfies only some 
of the participants’ goal. Of course, some subgroup may conspire to reap the prize 
of success, but then we do not have a ‘we-mode’ intentionally joint action to begin 
with, or else to ‘reap the prize’ denotes an intention distinct from the action that, as 
it were, produced the prize, and so is distinct from the joint action. 
In conclusion, we can build on definition 3.1 with the following two definitions:
3.2. Action-intentions represented in the a-content of s-sentences are jointly 
satisficeable if and only if, 
 (i) the action is jointly intentional (definition 3.1), 
 (ii)  the action is part-whole divisible with a part for each participant who 
accordingly intends to contribute with part-actions, and
 (iii) (i) and (ii) are mutually believed among the participants; 
3.3. Action-intentions represented in the a-content in s-sentences are jointly 
satisfied if and only if, every participant’s intention is satisfied, or no one’s is.
By ‘jointly satisficeable’ and ‘jointly satisfied’ I mean that it is possible for agents 
to jointly cause the action, and that the action was jointly caused, respectively. 
There are of course issues surrounding joint intentionality and joint agency to 
which I have had to turn a blind eye. One issue is that of intending someone else’s 
action. Philosophers are prompt to preclude mysterious ‘action at a distance’. To 
cause someone else’s action according to one’s own intention is often thought of 
as such mysterious action (See Searle 2010, 44–5). It is generally thought that it 
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is only possible to cause another’s action indirectly, by causing (e.g., persuading, 
deceiving, coercing) him or her to intend the action.4 In the present paper I assume, 
what is generally assumed, that agency presupposes that the action is intentional 
under some description, and that it is the acting agent’s intentions, as causes of the 
action, to which the description must refer. This is compatible with definition 3.2, 
since here joint intentions, as causes of joint action, must figure in a description of 
the action as jointly intentional – otherwise, there is no joint action.
Returning to the general purpose of my investigation into the possibility 
that groups referred to in s-sentences – given that such sentences refer – can 
succeed in carrying out actions specified in a-contents, and, hence, for utterances 
of s-sentences to be meaningful: it is necessary that the a-content specifies an 
action such that the ‘we’-members have a joint intention in the ‘we’-mode (3.1) for 
which the joint action opportunities obtain (3.2). If the ‘we’-members do not have 
a joint intention to perform the action represented in the a-content, then it must 
be possible for them to form such an intention, that is, a ‘we-mode’ joint intention. 
As accounted for in definition 3.1, this means that the ‘we’-members must have an 
interest in promoting shared goals, that these goals are collectively accepted under 
conditions of mutual belief, and that the ‘we’-members are collectively committed, 
that is, normatively bound, to promoting the goals. If these conditions are not met, 
then it is not, on the current analysis, meaningful to say “we will do it” or “we did it”.
Consider, now, ‘Europeans’, ‘Swedes’, ‘Portuguese’, ‘wage labourers’, and 
‘pensioners’. I have argued, consistently with established research, that whether 
any of these terms pick out real groups (correspond to institutional rather than 
social or physical facts), whose members prioritize group-identification and group-
interests, is a matter of volatile psychological relations. I have shown that, given 
that such groups exist and are referred to in s-sentences, it is from a conceptual 
point of view contentious to expect them to form join goals and to act on such 
goals successfully. There are extensive conditions that must obtain for success, as 
specified in 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3. 
These conclusions suggest that the ‘we’ to bear the burden of economic decline 
in present day Europe can only with great difficulty bear that burden in any real 
‘we’-sense, as proposed by some politicians. According to my investigation, this 
has not so much to do with what people want, as with what they believe they can 
together. Of course it is logically possible that typical s-sentence ‘we’-groups will 
act with typical a-content actions as their goals. For them to do so, though, it is 
necessary that they together conjure up prodigious amounts of faith, acceptance, 
and coordination. Furthermore, suppose that they do act in accordance with 
austerity policies, then it follows by definition that if they are successful everyone 
is successful as a ‘we’, and whatever gains there are to reap will be reaped by 
everyone. Conversely, if people do not act in accordance with austerity measures, 
4  For an alternative view, and an in depth discussion about the case of coercion, see 
Abraham Sesshu Roth (2004, 381–86) and Juljan Krause’s response (2012). See also 
Michael Bratman (1992/1999, 105; 1993/1999, 115).
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then that means that they do not accept that they should so act, at least as a ‘we’. 
Interestingly, if people do act in accordance with austerity policies but do not reap 
the supposed gains in equal measure, then that would mean that they have been 
by deceived by someone, or by some faction in their own group. And the fact that 
people act in accordance with austerity policies does not by itself mean that they 
voluntarily did so, but may be a result of contested legislation.  
In the last section before concluding I ask: given that there is a ‘we’ and that 
the ‘we’ can do together what is intended, is it economically rational to invoke a 
‘we’ rather than addressing individuals? Is the probable utility of us acting as a ‘we’ 
greater than the probable utility of us acting as separate individuals? These questions 
carry our investigation into the realm where game theory meets economics, where 
some philosophers and economists are questioning the orthodoxy of putting the 
individual centre stage when predicting and explaining action.
IV. The economical ‘we’
We have reached the point where we know what it means for austerity-policy 
expressions to refer and for the referent jointly to implement austerity policies. That 
is, we know what the conditions for satisfying s-sentences are, and that was my 
primary objective. 
Assuming from here on that the conditions of satisfaction, are met, let’s evaluate 
the economic rationale that is not expressed in s-sentences but is implied: that if 
we together do together what is proposed, we will in the long run receive a greater 
utility.
To evaluate the economic rationale, I turn to game theory. In game theory payoff-
involving action dilemmas are modelled, and predictions and prescriptions of action 
are formulated. Subsection 4.1 presents the basics and questions orthodox game 
theory, 4.2 reviews an alternative model, and 4.3 assesses the alternative and 
uses it to frame what I call the ‘European Dilemma’.   
4.1. The Basics of and problems in orthodox game theory
Game theorists use ‘matrices’ to model action dilemmas. Matrices represent the 




The game-matrix in Fig. 1 represents two possible choices, c and d, for two 
players, A and B. Players’ payoffs are a function of choice-combinations, (c,c), 
(c,d), (d,c), and (d,d), and are represented by x as A’s payoff and y as B’s. Let’s call 
choice-combinations ‘strategies’.
Different kinds of games can be modelled within standard game matrices. Two 
such games are the “Prisoners’ Dilemma” (PD) and “Hi-Lo”.
In orthodox game theory, players are assumed to be rational individualists, and 
are expected to ask, “What is rational for me to choose?” In PD-games, defect 
is the ‘dominant choice’, that is, the payoff from defecting is higher regardless 
of the other’s choice. Orthodox game theory also presupposes methodological 
individualism, that is, explanations of choices are couched in terms of individuals’ 
beliefs and desires (Lewis 1969). Orthodox game theory thus predicts that PD-
players will choose strategy (defect,defect) because that is the payoff-maximizing 
answer to the question, “What is rational for me to do?” (See Hakli, Miller, and 
Tuomela 2010, 293; Pacherie 2011, 184). 
Orthodox game theory faces two problems. First, it is repeatedly observed 
that players do not choose as orthodox game theory predicts. About half of PD-
players choose cooperate (Ostrom 2000; Colman et. al. 2008a; 2008b). Surely a 
theory with ≈ .5 prediction accuracy is not satisfactory. One might respond that 
this does not disprove the theory, but proves that players are not always rational. 
This response leads to the second problem: In orthodox game theory the rational 
x, y x, y








Fig. 2. PD. Fig. 3. Hi-Lo.
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           low   0, 0  1, 1 
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choice in any game is the individually payoff-maximizing choice, that is, the best 
reply to the other’s expected choice, also called the Nash equilibrium. In PD it is 
rational for B to choose defect given that A chooses defect, and so the strategy 
(defect,defect) is a Nash equilibrium. But notice that in the PD there is a Pareto 
optimal Nash equilibrium, i.e., a strategy where at least one player is better off 
and no-one is worse off, (cooperate,cooperate) with payoffs 2, 2. However, since 
orthodox game theory assumes players to be rational individualists who suppose 
that the other players are also rational individualists, (defect,defect) with payoffs 1, 1 
is prescribed as rational. But this is intuitively irrational, since (cooperate,cooperate) 
both maximizes total payoff and is Pareto optimal (See Gold and Sugden 2007, 
117–8). 
Consider the Hi-Lo game. In Hi-Lo there are two Nash equilibria (high,high) and 
(low,low) where the first strategy is Pareto optimal. Intuitively high is the rational 
choice. Strangely, orthodox game theory is indeterminate in Hi-Lo, since high 
is rational only given that the other player chooses high. But then again, for the 
second player, high is rational only given that the first chooses high, for whom high 
is rational only given that the other chooses high. And we have a regress (See 
Sugden 2000, 182; Colman et al. 2008a, 389).
Let’s call the first problem for orthodox game theory, its unreliable predictions, 
the ‘empirical’ problem. Let’s call the second the ‘prescriptive’ problem – prescribing 
non-Pareto strategies in PD and yielding indeterminate prescription in Hi-Lo.  
Various solutions to the prescriptive problem have been suggested. For instance, 
evidential decision theory suggests that players have strong expectations – assign 
a high probability – that others will choose as they themselves choose (Colman 
et al. 2008b, 409). In Hi-Lo there are two choices. It is equally likely that players 
choose high or low. According to evidential decision theory, then, B supposing A to 
be individualistically rational rationally chooses high as her part of the (high,high) 
strategy. The same goes for A. Both A and B, then, can be certain that the other will 
play high. But this involves a contradiction, since we start from the assumption that 
there are two equally likely choices. The reasoning by A and B is thus irrational, 
either because they are unjustified in the assignment of probabilities (by their own 
lights they are certain) or, because, as it turns out, their reasoning involves only one 
possible choice whereas in fact there are two (See Ibid, 410; 2008a, 390).
Taking the empirical and prescriptive problems seriously, economists and 
philosophers question the viability of orthodox game theory. A better approach, 
some suggest, is team-reasoning theory.
 
4.2. Team-reasoning theory
Michael Bacharach (1999, 118) describes team-reasoning as a player framing 
herself as a group -member, “putting herself in the position of an imaginary manager 
and determining the action which the manager would prescribe for her”. From this 
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hypothetical perspective players ask in the first person plural, “what strategy is 
rational for us?” and then choose their part in it (Ibid, 134–6). Team reasoning 
differs in structure from individualistic reasoning. In the former, players reason 
about strategies – arrays of choices of a team, a ‘profile’ – out of which one’s own 
action is chosen, while in the latter players choose their own actions given certain 
beliefs about others’ choices (Sugden 2000, 193; 2011, 18). 
Team-reasoning theorists do not claim that team-reasoning involves agency 
transformation, that there is a subject, the ‘group’, which acts. Rather, individuals 
can frame game matrices as collective action dilemmas and form joint intentions to 
act as a ‘we’ (Pacherie 2011, 184–5; Gold and Sugden 2007, 130). Frames are sets 
of concepts and descriptions that players use in self-reference. 
From the team-reasoning perspective, groups can nonetheless be interpreted 
as intentional agents whose actions are performed from a rational point of view – a 
point of view from which agents resolve contradictions in reasoning and conflicting 
attitudes, rank preferences, determine means for preference-satisfaction, and 
so on (Tollefsen 2002, 32). Groups can deliberate about the goals and means to 
satisfy goals, and so groups can be interpreted as intentional agents. This group-
intentional agency is not explainable in terms of I-intentional agency, since the 
preference rankings, means determination, and so on, is not necessarily found at 
membership-level. Choices that no player would arrive at in individual reasoning 
can be derived by individuals from team-reasoning (See Ibid, 42–3; for proof, see 
List and Pettit 2011, chapter 2). Although, ultimately, it is individuals that act and 
reason, the aggregation of individual attitudes can create an output that is not 
reducible to any individual attitudes. Thus the explanation for individuals’ choices in 
the team-reasoning paradigm departs from methodological individualism. Tollefsen 
(Ibid, 42) endorses methodological holism, according to which individuals’ actions 
are explained by an appeal to collective deliberation. Bacharach draws an analogy 
between team-reasoning and time-extended individual reasoning: just as time-
extended individuals choose at now in time, team-reasoning individuals choose at 
me in the team (1999, 143). Similarly, Sugden argues that individualistic reasoning 
is a special case of team-reasoning in that it can be modelled exactly as team-
reasoning but with a singleton team (2000, 195). Hakli, Miller and Tuomela (2010, 
310) suggest that players in the ‘we-mode’ (See section 3) reason from a meta-
standpoint where they ask about the game-matrix, not what to choose, but how to 
frame the problem, and then they ask about the strategies, not “what should I do?” 
but “what should we do?” and act accordingly.
Team-reasoning theory thus departs radically from orthodox game-theory by 
questioning methodological individualism. It is predictable in team-reasoning theory 
that players choose cooperate in PD and high in High-Lo, and it prescribes these 
choices. Thus team-reasoning theory can solve the empirical and prescriptive 
problems in orthodox game theory by moving from ‘I’-reasoning to ‘we’-reasoning. 
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4.3. Game-matrix transformation and utility-maximization
Let’s assume that team-reasoning theory is conceptually tenable. Is, then, team-
reasoning with regard to the s-sentences’ a-contents likely to maximize the utility?
To answer this question, we need to understand the structure of the game 
represented in s-sentences – austerity policies. The structure need not be simple 
but should correspond to current state of affairs. 
On close examination, s-sentences represent a typical commons dilemma. 
In common dilemmas individuals choose to take or refrain from taking from a 
common good (Brewer and Kramer 1986, 543). Likewise, austerity measures 
involve dispensation with common goods, such as welfare programmes and low 
retirement age. 
Commons dilemmas can be represented in the PD-structure. The argument for 
this is: if, as proposed in s-sentences, resources are sparse but are expected to 
be replenished if people adhere to austerity, then (i) defection-defection postpone 
replenishment in exchange for small immediate gains – small since both players 
share the spoils – (ii) cooperation-cooperation precipitates replenishment in 
exchange for a postponed greater gain, and (iii) defection-cooperation postpone 
replenishment in exchange for one player’s immediate gain – one takes it all and 
the resource has to be replenished. Thus, we have the traditional PD-structure. 
Lets call this PD-type game, imaginatively, the “European Dilemma” (EUD). 
In orthodox game theory players of the European Dilemma are expected to 
maximize their respective payoffs. In accordance with methodological individualism, 
the prescribed rational choice – the answer to the question “what should I do?” – is 
defect, and thus the (defect,defect) strategy is predicted.
Fig. 4. EUD.
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Enter team-reasoning theory. From the perspective of team-reasoning, the first 
step is asking what question (‘I’ or ‘We’) should be asked about which strategy 
would be rational. Thus we have the meta-EUD: 
From this matrix, team-reasoning players conclude that the rational question 
to ask about the game is the we-question, since the answer to that question is the 
Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium, the (cooperate,cooperate) strategy. Remember 
that when it comes to acting as a ‘we’, the payoff is a ‘we’-payoff. That is, on 
the current approach, if ‘we’ succeed every member of the ‘we’ succeeds (See 
Tuomela 2007). 
To clarify Figure 5, in the top-left cell, if A and B ask the we-question about 
(cooperate-cooperate) they conclude that the we-utility is 4, while if they ask the 
I-question they conclude that 2 is their respective utility. In the top-right and bottom-
left cells, if A and B ask the we-question about (cooperate-defect) and (defect-
cooperate) respectively, they will conclude that the we-utility is 3, while if they ask 
the I-question they will conclude that the utility is 0, 3 and 3, 0 respectively. The 
bottom-right cell is the inverse of the top-left – defecting as a team yields a we-
utility 2, while defecting as individuals yields a utility 1.
Team-reasoning thus enables matrix-transformation. Players first settle on 
how to frame the game, they then reason about strategy, and, lastly, they act 
accordingly. When there is a pay-off dominant strategy, we-reasoning players will 
be guaranteed maximum group-utility (Hakli, Miller, and Tuomela 2010, 317) rather 
than the third-best utility (1, 1) predicted by orthodox game theory. 
The EU-dilemma is, remember, a PD-type game. But via team-reasoning and 
the meta-version of the dilemma we arrive at another game entirely. Lets call it the 
‘we’-utility game (WE-U): 
Fig. 5. Meta-EUD.
(4) / (2, 2)
(3) / (3, 0)
(3) / (0, 3)
(2) / (1, 1)
We c/ I c We d/ I d
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It should be obvious what the rational choice in the WE-U game is. It should 
also be obvious from the preceding analysis why orthodox game theory does not 
yield this result.
There are complicating issues to be dealt with by team-reasoning theorists, no 
doubt. For instance, when are the players assured that the others players team-
reason? Rewardingly, we have already dealt with this issue above (definition 3.1, 
condition (ii); see also Tuomela and Tuomela 2005, 71–4). Another issue is coercion, 
which has also been dealt with above (in 2.3 (iii), 3.1 (ii), and 3.2 (i)). On coercion 
Bacharach writes, when team-reasoning agents act on intentions formulated by 
others but are left to figure out for themselves what their respective part-actions 
are, we are dealing with coerced agency (1999, 119). This conception of coercion 
comes close to the very object of my investigation: austerity-policies’ intentional 
content for the ‘we’ to implement without the ‘we’ being unambiguously addressed 
or the appropriate actions for implementing austerity openly submitted. Whether or 
not coercion is a concept, suitably defined, the signification of which applies to the 
present state of affairs in the EU will be further discussed below. 
Another issue is that of repeated games (Crawford 1991; Ellison 1993). In 
repeated games players are in position to learn and predict other players’ decisions 
(Sugden 2003). The effects on payoffs from repeated PD-games is that if players 
know the number of rounds, they will defect in the last round, the explanation being 
that in the final game there is no risk of giving the other player the impression that 
one is a defector, which may lead to future sub-optimal payoffs (Bicchieri 1990). 
This explanation of ‘closing defection’ presupposes that players do not wish to be 
identified as defectors. That concern has indeed been found to be motivated. It 
has been observed that when people are in a position to punish defectors they are 
willing to spend resources on monitoring and sanctioning systems (Ostrom 1990, 
2000). Thus, although sanctioning has a cost, it seems that it is something people 
are prepared to pay in order to maintain cooperation. This fact, in turn, can explain 
why, in repeated games, the level of cooperation does not decline but remains 
between forty and sixty per cent (Ostrom 2000). 
For present purposes, the data from experiments with game repetition points 
toward the following consideration. Consider what happens if, in a repeated EUD, 
austerity policies are imposed successfully (people collectively accept them and 
manage to actualise them as a we), but either the expectations of utility are not 
Fig. 6. WE-U.
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met or utility is passed upon a subgroup of the ‘we’. In that case, positions are 
revealed: some players become known as co-operators and others as defectors. 
In future games this presumably leads those of the first group to defect and a sub-
optimal payoff to result. Indeed, according to the reviewed data, if players have 
learnt that others cooperate, then it makes no sense to defect. So if the EUD is a 
repeated game (remember that by the time this article is written the fifth austerity 
measure had been passed in Greece), defection by some players is indicative of 
distrust among players, which in turn indicates that either the expected utilities 
have not been met before or they have only accrued to a few. That is to say, people 
have learnt that co-operators are exploited and that defection is at least minimally 
rewarding. That the EUD is a repeated game can be affirmed with reference to 
how the game matrix was brought about: politicians addressing a ‘we’ to implement 
policies. That matrix, even if relatively new on the EU scale, is a repeating matrix; 
so the game played is a repeating game. From these considerations it is justified 
to conclude, from the premises that (i) people do not identify with the ‘we’, (ii) do 
not commit themselves to the action (austerity implementation) expressed as a 
‘we’-goal, and (iii) do not choose to frame their current situation as one in which 
‘we’-reasoning is rational, that its reasonable for the people under consideration 
to not trust the estimated utility of playing the ‘EU game’ and to not believe that 
the distribution of yielded utility will be measured according to cooperation. Of 
course, it is not obvious that the state of the EU makes these premises true and the 
conclusion follows. Either way, if, for instance, the Greeks or the Portuguese do not 
accept austerity policies, then we can start to check off the premises to arrive at an 
explanation. As the saying goes, you have made your bed and now you will have 
to lie in it – or, concerning austerity policies, as the game has been played people 
will play it again. And this is supported by the reviewed data on repeated games.  
This section closes the circle that I have drawn around austerity policies. The 
considerations put forward here reinforce the central theme in this contribution: it 
makes sense to propose austerity measures, and there are prospects for payoffs, 
only to the extent that those addressed to bear the burden represent the situation 
as one in which they, as a we, should act. In the long run it seems that the only 
alternative to meaningfully addressing a ‘we’ to bear the burden is to create it by 
enforcement or coercion; and this might be necessary for the ‘we’ to comply given 
that the game is known from repetition to be rigged for the benefit of a few rather 
than the common benefit of the ‘we’. 
V. Conclusion
I am not implying that it is philosophically unthinkable that Europeans, Swedes, 
Portuguese, or other groups will cooperate as a ‘we’ and jointly overcome current 
hardships. Neither would it be psychologically extraordinary. There is no psycho-
philosophical incoherence in conceiving people acting as a ‘we’, as a jointly 
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intentional agent. Were we to retrospect in the future and triumphantly proclaim, 
“We did it!” this would not disprove anything I have said. We should be sceptical, 
though, and ask who it was that did what on whose intention. This scepticism is not 
motivated by fear of having theories disproved, but by the hope that it is true that we 
did it. Because if it is true, then, new developments in economics and game theory 
suggest that our payoff will be greater than if we did not (section 4).   
Retrospectively we can test whether it is true that we overcame economic 
decline. If it is true, then there should be no individuals in ‘the EU’ whose intentions 
are satisfied while the European people’s are not, and there should be no individual 
whose payoff, as a result of what we did, is greater than others’. These are no 
moral dictates. It is how it should be, by definition, if indeed we bore the burden of 
economic decline (section 3).
Will we bear that burden? To answer that we need to know who we are, who we 
want to be, what we want, whether we want to do it together, and how to share the 
burden. And that is ultimately a matter of what characteristics we have in common, 
if we freely choose those characteristics, what we mutually believe, and whether 
we are ready to accept the intentions others set for us to implement together as a 
collective (section 2).  
Perhaps austerity policies can succeed regardless of the psychological, 
philosophical, and game theory preconditions I have illuminated. In that case, at 
best, they are not intended to be satisfied by the people at all but intended for the 
people to satisfy, and then ‘we’ cannot share the burden but only the bondage to 
re-establish someone’s economic privileges.  
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